Top-down processes are widely assumed to be essential in visual awareness, subjective experience of seeing. However, previous studies have not tried to separate directly the roles of different types of top-down influences in visual awareness. We studied the effects of top-down preparation and object substitution masking (OSM) on visual awareness during categorization of objects presented in natural scene backgrounds. The results showed that preparation facilitated categorization but did not influence visual awareness. OSM reduced visual awareness and impaired categorization. The dissociations between the effects of preparation and OSM on visual awareness and on categorization imply that they influence at different stages of cognitive processing. We propose that preparation influences at the top of the visual hierarchy, whereas OSM interferes with processes occurring at lower levels of the hierarchy. These lower level processes play an essential role in visual awareness.
Introduction
In the classical hierarchical view of visual processing, neurons at low-level cortical areas (V1, V2) represent simple features such as orientation, color, and location (Hubel & Wiesel, 1968) . They output to higher cortical levels (V3, V4, MT), which have lower spatial resolution and represent complex features. Object recognition and categorization occur when the activation reaches the highest levels (inferotemporal areas, prefrontal areas). Recent theories of visual processing and awareness emphasize that top-down (reentrant, recurrent, feedback) processes play an important role in visual perception, particularly in visual awareness (i.e., in subjective experience of seeing) (Bullier, 2001; Campana & TallonBaudry, 2013; Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002; Lamme, 2006; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000) . They argue that the feedforward flow of activation from low levels to the higher ones is not sufficient for vivid conscious perception, although it may enable unconsciously guided responding. The contribution of top-down feedback to the low-level areas is assumed to be either a general prerequisite for any kind of conscious perception to emerge (e.g., Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Lamme, 2006) or necessary for detailed conscious vision (Campana & Tallon-Baudry, 2013; Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002) . For example, according to Reverse Hierarchy Theory (RHT) (Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002 ) the feedforward hierarchy acts nonconsciously and conscious perception emerges at highlevel cortex, representing complex aspects or the gist of the scene. At a later stage of processing, conscious perception returns to lower areas via reentrant feedback connections, to integrate the detailed information into conscious vision. However, there has been little effort to dissociate behaviourally the effects of different types of top-down processes on visual awareness.
In contrast to theories of visual awareness, research on visual categorization of objects in natural scene backgrounds has stressed the power of bottom-up or feedforward processing. An influential study (Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996) showed that brain's electrical responses differentiated animal images from non-animal images already 150 ms after stimulus-onset. Later studies have confirmed the high-speed (Fabre- Thorpe, 2011) , and measurements of saccadic latencies indicate that the fastest saccadic latencies toward target images may occur within 120 ms (Kirchner & Thorpe, 2006; Wu, Crouzet, Thorpe, & Fabre-Thorpe, 2015) . In addition, heavy load on attention interferes only little with categorization (Fize, Fabre-Thorpe, Richard, Doyon, & Thorpe, 2005; Li, VanRullen, Koch, & Perona, 2002) . The high speed of visual categorization and its independence from attentional load is consistent with the feedforward model of categorization.
On the other hand, categorization of objects in natural images at the basic level (e.g., dog vs. non-dog) is more demanding than at the superordinate level (e.g., animal vs. non-animal). Natural images are faster to categorize at the superordinate level ('animal') than at the basic level ('dog') (Macé, Joubert, Nespoulous, & Fabre-Thorpe, 2009; Poncet, Reddy, & Fabre-Thorpe, 2012) . Saccadic eye movements indicate that while superordinate level targets can be detected already 120 ms after the onset of the stimulus, basic level targets cannot be detected as quickly (Wu et al., 2015) . Mack and Palmeri (2015) found the superordinatelevel advantage compared to basic level with short stimulus duration but the effect reversed with longer durations into a basic-level advantage. However, a series of experiments (Poncet & FabreThorpe, 2014 ) showed that the superordinate-level advantage is robust, and does not depend on the stimulus duration and thus is not a result of the coarser information quality associated with briefly flashed stimuli. Thus, the basic level categorization needs a longer information uptake time, but the kind of processing that is carried on during the extra time is not clear. Spatial attention is ruled out by the finding that basic-level categorization was possible during a concurrent task that put strong load on attentional resources (Poncet et al., 2012) . One possibility is that conscious top-down processing is required for finer object representations that are required in discriminating different category members at basic level. Koivisto and Rientamo (2016) found that masked images produced priming for superordinate level (animal vs. non-animal) but not for basic level (dog vs. horse) categorization. Basic level priming occurred only when the prime images were not masked and thus consciously accessible. The (unconscious) feedforward flow of information might result in a coarse representation which allows discrimination between superordinate categories (Fabre- Thorpe, 2011; Koivisto, Kastrati, & Revonsuo, 2014) but is not detailed enough for making more fine-grained discriminations between basic categories.
In summary, the observations seem to converge on the conclusion that categorization at the superordinate level (e.g., animal or non-animal) may occur in feedforward manner, and possibly without the contribution of awareness (Koivisto & Rientamo, 2016; Koivisto et al., 2014) , whereas categorization at the basic level (e.g., dog or non-dog) requires more time, perhaps an additional phase of top-down, feedback processing. However, it still remains possible that top-down processes do play some role in visual categorization at the superordinate level. The procedure in standard experiments on categorization is such that attention can be prepared in advance for detecting the target images. In each stimulus block, the participants categorize the target image according to whether it represents the category that is defined at the beginning of the task block (e.g., ''press GO when there is an animal"). Such preparation or expectancy may bias processing in favour of the searched-for category (Peelen, Fei-Fei, & Kastner, 2009; Peelen & Kastner, 2011) . In Experiment 1 we tested directly whether topdown preparation plays a role in visual categorization at superordinate or basic level as well as in visual awareness by manipulating the experimental task such that in the blocked condition, in which preparation was possible, the procedure followed the typical categorization protocol in which each target image was categorized according to whether or not it represented the category that was specified before the task block began. In the non-blocked condition, the category varied randomly from trial to trial and it was specified only after the offset of the target image. Thus, topdown preparation was possible in the blocked condition but not in the non-blocked condition. In Experiment 2, preparation was manipulated by presenting the relevant category name either only after the target image had been presented (post-cue) or also before the target image was presented (pre-cue).
In addition, both experiments used object substitution masking (OSM) (Enns & Di Lollo, 1997) to manipulate another type of process that is known to influence visual awareness of natural images (Koivisto et al., 2014) . OSM is widely assumed to selectively influence the reentrant stage of processing (Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000, but see Francis & Hermens, 2002; Põder, 2013) while leaving feedforward processes intact (e.g., Goodhew, Visser, Lipp, & Dux, 2011; Koivisto, 2012) . In a typical OSM experiment, a target stimulus and a mask (e.g., dots surrounding the target) appear simultaneously in a display containing 1 to 16 stimuli but the offset of the mask is delayed so that it persists to be visible after the offset of the target. Compared with the simultaneous offset of the target and mask, the delayed offset of the mask impairs the visibility of the target. The object substitution theory (Di Lollo et al., 2000) explains this masking effect by assuming that after initial encoding of the stimulus display at a low level, feedforward activation proceeds to higher levels where a tentative, low resolution representation (a perceptual hypothesis) is formed. This representation involves ambiguity which can be resolved on the second and later iterations by comparing the high level coarse representation with the initial pattern of activity at the lower level. When the offset of the mask is delayed, the tentative representation (target + mask) does not match with information at the lower level (mask). Therefore, the representation (target + mask) is replaced or updated (Moore & Lleras, 2005) with that of the trailing mask and the observer perceives only the mask.
We studied the roles of the two types of top-down processes (attentional preparation and OSM-dependent processes) in visual categorization and awareness by manipulating both at the same time. The hypothesis that visual awareness depends on top-down processing (Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002; Lamme, 2006) , whereas categorization at superordinate level may succeed on the basis of the feedforward sweep reaching the higher levels in hierarchy (Fabre- Thorpe, 2011; Thorpe et al., 1996) , predicts that visual awareness, but not superordinate level categorization, should depend on manipulations of top-down processing. On the other hand, if more fine-grained discriminations between category instances at the basic level cannot be made on the basis of the feedforward sweep but require top-down processing (Koivisto & Rientamo, 2016) , basic level categorization should be influenced by the top-down manipulations. The manipulation of preparation and OSM allowed us to study in more detail their relationship during categorization and awareness as it is not clear whether they influence the same or different stages of visual processing.
Experiment 1

Methods
Participants
Thirty-two healthy students (8 male; age 19-30 years) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated. The experiments were conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and with the understanding and written consent of each participant. Experiment 1 was run in two different laboratories (16 participants in each laboratory) with two different experimenters but with the same equipment.
Stimuli
All visual stimuli were color photographs of object in natural scene backgrounds from the study by Koivisto and Rientamo (2016, Experiment 1) . The images of animals and non-animals varied in luminance, color, and spatial frequency, and represented a mixture of general views and close-ups so that the categorization tasks could not be performed on the basis of low level visual features. The participants had not seen the photographs before. The positive stimuli (i.e. those requiring 'yes' responses) in the superordinate (animal/non-animal) categorization condition represented horses (n = 64), dogs (n = 64), and birds (n = 64) (total n = 192). The negative stimuli (total n = 96), requiring 'no' responses, represented vehicles (n = 32), buildings (n = 32) and a mixed category of other human-made objects, landscapes, plants, fruits, and vegetables (n = 32).
The same dog, horse, and bird images served as positive stimuli in the basic level categorization condition. In addition, images of other large mammals (n = 32), small mammals (n = 32), and mixed category of insects, fishes and reptiles (n = 32) served as negative stimuli (requiring 'no' response) for horses, dogs, and birds, respectively.
In addition, 24 filler stimuli were constructed by pixelating 24 additional animal and non-animal images (not included as the experimental images) in to a 6 x 6 grid in such way that the content of the original images could not be recognized. These fillers were used as non-target stimuli in the stimulus displays (i.e., they were not surrounded by the dots).
We analyzed the mean luminance and the luminance of each RGB layer in the stimulus images (Matlab 7.9.0, Image Processing Toolbox). They were compared in one-way ANOVAs between the animal targets (horses, dogs, birds), non-animals (vehicles, buildings, mixed non-animal category [fruits, plants, man-made objects, etc.] and negative animal categories used at basic level categorization (large mammals, small mammals, and mixed non-birds [fishes, insects, reptiles]. The mean luminance across RGB layers did not differ between the categories, F(2,384) = 2.81, p = 0.062. Separate analyses of the layers showed that the luminance of non-animal images was lower than those of the other categories in red layer (F(2,384) = 7.10, p = 0.001) and in green layer (F (2,384) = 4.93, p = 0.008) but not in blue layer (F(2,384) = 1.22, p = 0.295). Thus, although the mean luminance did not differ between the categories, the non-animal images contained less red and green than the animal images.
Procedure
Each participant took part in two conditions: blocked and nonblocked conditions. Half of the participants accomplished the blocked condition first, followed by the non-blocked condition, and the other half performed the conditions in the reversed order. The blocked condition was identical to the typical conditions in previous experiments on natural categorization. In each blocked series of trials, the participants were instructed to decide whether the target stimulus represents a category member from a category that was specified before the task begun. The category was, depending on the series, either ''animal" (superordinate level condition), or ''bird", ''horse" or ''dog" (basic level condition, divided into three sub-series according to the basic category). Thus, in the blocked condition the category stayed constant across each series and preparation to categorize the target into the specified category was possible. In the non-blocked condition, the categorization task varied randomly within each task series: the category into which the target was to be categorized was indicated only after the stimuli had been disappeared and hence the participants could not prepare in advance to categorize the target into any specific one of the possible categories.
The stimuli were presented on 19 00 CRT screen (1024 Â 768 pixels, 85 Hz) in both laboratories from the viewing distance of 120 cm. Each trial began with a fixation cross (0.2°) for 1000 ms, followed by the stimulus array consisting of eight stimuli (2.4°Â 2.4°) centered 4.5°away from the fixation (Fig. 1) . One of the stimuli in the array was the target which was surrounded by eight dots (each 0.3°i n diameter, centered about 0.4°from the border of the target). The other seven stimuli in the array were randomly selected fillers. In the superordinate condition, the array was presented for 106 ms; in the basic level condition, the duration of the array was 153 ms in order to compensate for the greater information uptake time needed for access to basic level representations (Macé et al., 2009; Poncet et al., 2012) . In the unmasked condition, the stimuli and the dots offset at the same time, whereas in the masked condition the dots remained on the screen for 300 ms after the stimuli offset. The name of the category into which the target had to be categorized was presented 1000 ms after the offset of the stimulus array until the participant made a response.
Ɵme FixaƟon SƟmulus display
Mask (or blank) Category name Awareness raƟng Fig. 1 . An example of a masked trial. After the fixation, the stimulus display was presented; the target image was surrounded by eight dots. In unmasked trials, the dots were turned off simultaneously with the images, whereas in masked trials they remained on the screen after the offset of the images. In the blocked condition, the name of the category ('animal', 'bird', 'dog', or 'horse'), according to which the target was to be categorized, was told to the participants before the tasks began and they categorized each image in the task series according to this category. In the non-blocked condition, the category name was presented only after the images had disappeared. The participants made a forced-choice decision concerning whether the target represented an instance of the category or not, followed by rating of their subjective awareness of the target.
The participants were asked to categorize the target as accurately as possible according to whether it represented an example from the specified category or not. After having categorized the target, the participants rated the quality of their subjective perception of the target on a modified perceptual awareness scale (PAS) (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004) in which 0 = "I did not see the target at all", 1 = I saw a glimpse of something but my response was a guess, 2 = I saw an animal/object with weak clarity", 3 = ''I saw the animal/object clearly and could identify it".
Each target stimulus appeared equally often in each of the eight positions. Each participant was presented with a total of 384 trials: 192 in the blocked and 192 in the non-blocked condition. Half of the trials were superordinate and half basic-level categorization trials. Each horse, dog, and bird stimulus served equally often as the target in the superordinate and basic level categorization conditions, but one participant saw each stimulus only either in the superordinate or basic level condition; the negative stimuli served only either in the superordinate condition (non-animals such as vehicles, buildings, etc.) or only in the basic level condition (e.g., non-horses such as large mammals). Half of the trials in each condition were masked. Each image was presented only once for each participant, but equally often across the participants in the masked and unmasked conditions, and in the blocked and non-blocked conditions. In each condition, the probability that the target was an example from the specified category was 50%.
Results
Categorization
Due to an error in the procedure, the data from one of the participants could not be included in the analyses and the following analyses are based on the data from 31 participants. Response accuracy was analyzed with the discrimination index d', derived from the signal detection theory by scoring correct positive responses as hits and incorrect positive responses (i.e., ''yes" in response to a target that did not belong to the specified category) as false alarms. A Preparation (2: blocked vs. non-blocked) Â Category level (2: superordinate vs. basic) Â Mask (2) Â Laboratory (2) Â Order (2: blocked condition as first or second) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on d's (Fig. 2) . The factors Laboratory and Order were not of interest, but they were included to reduce the variance due to these factors.
The analysis revealed a main effect for Preparation ( The lack of masking at superordinate level cannot be attributed to a ceiling effect. In terms of percent correct, the accuracy level in unmasked condition at superordinate level corresponds to 78% correct and at basic level to 70% correct. These values are not near ceiling or floor.
Awareness
Next, the ANOVA was performed on the mean values of subjective ratings of awareness for animal images (scale: 0-3) (Fig. 3) . The mean ratings of awareness were slightly, but not significantly, higher at the basic level (1.84) than at the superordinate level (1. In summary, preparation influenced categorization but did not affect subjective visual awareness. OSM impaired categorization at basic level and subjective visual awareness independent of the category level.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, preparation was manipulated in blocked manner so that in the blocked condition the category into which the images had to be categorized was given before the task began. This kind of blocked condition is similar to the typical procedure in experiments on categorization of objects in natural images (Thorpe et al., 1996) . In each blocked condition, half of the images were members of the given category. Therefore, for example, when categorizing 'dogs' at the basic level, in the blocked condition the specific target category members were present on 50% of trials, whereas in the non-blocked condition the same categorycategory member combination was present only on 17% of trials. This created confound related to the different rates of repetition of the same category. Therefore, in the blocked condition, participants were exposed to many more dogs within the same time frame than in the non-blocked condition, possibly making the task easier due to priming of dog representation. Thus, the differences between blocked and non-blocked conditions may have, at least partly, reflected the difference in trial sequence rather than the possibility to prepare for the task. To avoid this confound in Experiment 2, preparation was manipulated in non-blocked manner within the same task series by presenting a pre-cue (i.e., the name of the target category) before the stimulus array appeared (50% of trials) or a neutral cue that did not prepare attention to any category.
Methods
Participants
Thirty-two healthy students (5 male; age 19-29 years) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated. The experiment was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and with the understanding and written consent of each participant.
Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1. The procedure was changed in such way that now we did not use blocked stimulus presentation in the preparation condition, but all conditions were presented randomly within stimulus blocks.
The stimuli were presented on 19 00 CRT screen (1024 Â 768 pixels, 85 Hz) from the viewing distance of 120 cm. The stimulation sequence was otherwise identical to the non-blocked condition of Experiment 1 (Fig. 1) , but now each trial began either with a row of X-letters (XXXXX) in the post-cued condition (i.e., uncued condition), or by the category name (animal, dog, horse, or bird) in the pre-cued condition, presented for 1000 ms at the center of the screen. Both conditions ended with the post-cue (i.e., category name).
The participants were asked to categorize the target as accurately as possible according to whether it represented an example from the specified category or not. They were told that in half of the trials the name of the category, according to which the target was to be categorized, will be presented already before the stimuli will appear, whereas in the other half only a row of Xs will precede the stimuli; in both cases, the category name will be presented after the offset of the stimuli. After having categorized the target, the participants rated the quality of their subjective perception of the target on a modified perceptual awareness scale (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004) in which 1 = "I did not see the target at all", 2 = I saw a glimpse of something but my response was a guess, 3 = I saw an animal/object with weak clarity", 4 = ''I saw the animal/object clearly and could identify it").
The target appeared equally often in each of the eight positions. Similar to Experiment 1, each image was presented only once for each participant, but equally often across the participants in the masked and unmasked conditions, and in the pre-and post-cue conditions. Each positive animal stimulus served equally often as the target in the superordinate and basic level categorization conditions. A practice block (with different stimuli) was performed before the experimental trials (384 trials/participant) were run, separated by brief resting periods after each 100 trials.
Results
Accuracy
A Preparation (2: post-cue vs. pre-cue) Â Category level (2: superordinate vs. basic) Â Mask (2) ANOVA was conducted on d's (Fig. 4) . The main effect for Category level (F(1,31) The results seem to differ from those of Experiment 1 in such way that now preparation influenced only in the masked trials and the results do not replicate the smaller masking effect for superordinate than for basic level. The high performance in the unmasked post-cued condition of Experiment 2 (Fig. 4) , as compared with that in the unmasked non-blocked condition of Experiment 1 (Fig. 2) , seems to be the most obvious data point in which the results of the experiments differ. An Experiment (2) Â Preparation ( responsible for the lack of preparation effect in unmasked trials of Experiment 2. Note that all the other conditions (masked superordinate, unmasked basic level, and masked basic level conditions) show evidence for the influence of preparation.
Awareness
Next, the ANOVA was performed on the mean values of subjective ratings of awareness for animal images (scale: 0-3) (Fig.5) . The mean ratings of awareness were significantly higher at the basic level than at the superordinate level (F(1,31) These results suggest that visual awareness is decreased by OSM, but the images are consciously seen with equal quality independent of the preparation of attention, replicating the findings of Experiment 1.
Discussion
We tested the effects of top-down preparation or presetting of attention and object substitution masking (OSM) on categorization and visual awareness of objects presented in natural images. In Experiment 1, preparation was possible when the target category remained constant during each test block. In Experiment 2, the target category changed in trial-to-trial manner and preparation was possible in trials in which the name of the target category was presented before the object image was presented. In both experiments, top-down preparation enhanced categorization but did not have any effect on subjective visual awareness. By contrast, OSM influenced subjective visual awareness and impaired categorization in both experiments. The dissociations between the effects of top-down preparation and OSM suggest that they influenced separate stages of processing.
There were two findings which did not generalize across the experiments: superordinate level categorization was influenced by OSM only in Experiment 2 and the influence of preparation on categorization was restricted mostly to masked trials in Experiment 2. These contrary findings seemed to arise from the relatively low performance level in the unmasked superordinate categorization in non-blocked (post-cued) condition of Experiment 1, as compared with that in the post-cued condition of Experiment 2. One explanation for this finding might be that those of the participants who begun Experiment 1 with the non-blocked condition had not yet experienced the different animal categories in blocked conditions, and therefore, their general preparation for the animal category was more restricted as compared with the participants who performed the blocked conditions for each category first. In fact, post-hoc t-test for unmasked non-blocked superordinate condition of Experiment 1 showed that performance was lower when the non-blocked condition was performed first (mean d' = 1.3, SE = 0.1) than when performed after the blocked conditions (mean d' = 1.9, SE = 0.1), t(29) = 3.85, p = 0.001; the order did not have any effect in the other conditions, ts 1.13, ps ! 0.269. Thus, exposure to the stimuli during blocked conditions primed the superordinate animal category. In Experiment 2, the post-cue and pre-cue conditions were randomly distributed across the task series, so that this effect could not bias the results.
Visual categorization was more difficult at the basic level than at the superordinate level in both experiments. This pattern is consistent with previous results which have shown that natural images are easier to categorize at superordinate than at basic level (Macé et al., 2009; Poncet & Fabre-Thorpe, 2014) . A plausible explanation for this is that basic level categories are typically visually more similar to other basic level categories of the same superordinate category, as compared with the similarity between different superordinate categories. In addition, some color differences or other uncontrolled differences in low-level visual features between animal and non-animal images may have made the superordinate level categorization easier compared with basic level categorization which involved only animal images. The difficulty of basic level categorization depends strongly on the similarity of the target category to the contrast category (Macé et al., 2009 ). Here we used contrast categories that were rather similar to the target categories at the basic level (e.g., horses vs. other large mammals). The superordinate level advantage occurred even with the relatively long stimulus durations (100 for superordinate level, 150 ms for basic level). This fits with the results of Poncet and Fabre- Thorpe (2014) who found a superordinate level advantage with long durations (but see Mack & Palmeri, 2015) . In spite of the strong advantage for superordinate level in categorization, subjective awareness was rated to be higher during basic level categorization, statistically significantly in Experiment 2 and nearly significantly in Experiment 1. This basic level advantage probably reflects the longer stimulus duration in basic level conditions. The accuracy of categorization was more vulnerable to OSM at the basic level than at the superordinate level in Experiment 1. However, we were not able to replicate this difference in Experiment 2. Thus, the results do not fully support the prediction that OSM should influence basic level categorization more than superordinate categorization. This prediction was derived from the theories that emphasize the importance of reentrant/recurrent/ feedback processing in processing of detailed information (Di Lollo et al., 2000; Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002; Lamme, 2006) and from the assumption that OSM interferes with reentry or feedback to early visual areas. An alternative explanation for the superordinate level advantage in categorization (and for possible unequal effects of OSM at the different category levels) might propose that access to basic categories simply needs a longer passive information up-take time than access to superordinate level (Fabre- Thorpe, 2011) , and that information decay faster due to OSM. The difference between the reentrant (recurrent) hypothesis and the up-take time hypothesis is that the reentrant account presents a specific explanation for the longer up-take time. However, the reentrant theory of Di Lollo et al. (2000) has been criticized since its birth. Francis and Hermens's (2002) modeling of attention in terms of mask intensity was not plausible and that some of the feedforward models in fact included reentrant components. Later, best fit with the results was found with models involving reentrant processes (Di Lollo, von Mühlenen, Enns, & Bridgeman, 2004; Francis & Cho, 2007) . More recently, Põder (2013) proposed a feedforward account that relies on the assumption that the mask adds noise to the representation of the target. The longer the trailing mask, the smaller the signal-to-noise ratio will be. Once attention is directed to the target, it finds a degraded target representation (for response, see Di Lollo, 2014). In addition, some of the basic empirical findings behind the reentrant theory, such as the dependence of OSM on spatial attention, did not replicate in recent studies that have controlled for ceiling effects (Argyropoulos, Gellatly, Pilling, & Carter, 2013; Camp, Pilling, Argyropoulos, & Gellatly, 2015; Filmer, Mattingley, & Dux, 2014; Pilling, Gellatly, Argyropoulos, & Skarratt, 2014) , questioning the assumption that OSM depends on iterative hypothesis testing that relies on spatial attention. Even though the reentrant theory might not be valid in its original form, it remains possible that OSM interferes with some other type of interaction between and within higher and earlier visual areas during visual categorization tasks. The existence of large feedback connections from higher areas back to earlier ones and their role in shaping the responses of neurons in early visual areas have been firmly established (for reviews, see e.g., Bullier, 2001; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000) . Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies on humans have revealed that the early visual areas play a causal role in categorization of objects in natural images also in a late time window, after the higher areas have been activated (Camprodon, Zohary, Brodbeck, & Pascual-Leone, 2009; Koivisto, Railo, Revonsuo, Vanni, & Salminen-Vaparanta, 2011) . These findings suggest that higher and lower areas continue to interact after the feedforward sweep has passed the early visual cortex.
Top-down preparation to detect objects from specified category facilitated categorization without influencing the ratings of awareness in both experiments. The dissociation between the effects of preparation on categorization and awareness suggests that these two phenomena are influenced by distinct types of top-down processes. The top-down source of the preparative activity is probably in the frontal lobes (Cristescu, Devlin, & Nobrea, 2006; Peelen et al., 2011) . Preparation to detect objects from specified categories activates neurons representing the target category at high levels of visual hierarchy (Peelen et al., 2009; Peelen et al., 2011) , biasing processing in favor of the target category. TMS of anterior temporal areas (Chiou & Ralph, 2016) and posterior temporal cortex (Reeder, Perini, & Peelen, 2015) suggests that these areas have a causal influence on detection of objects from expected categories. In this context, the facilitation of categorization by preparation can be explained by assuming that top-down preparation in frontal lobes activates a template of the expected category at high levels of visual hierarchy. In other words, preparation pre-activates neurons representing the target category and visual categorization is facilitated when the sensory information match to the templates.
Top-down preparation to perceive a stimulus from a specific category did not influence the subjective ratings of visual awareness. Previous studies have found that such expectations facilitate object's access to awareness, when the objects have been made ambiguous by their presentation during binocular suppression to one eye while masks are flashed to the other eye (Pinto, van Gaal, de Lange, Lamme, & Seth, 2015; Stein & Peelen, 2015) . However, Pinto et al. (2015) studied also non-ambiguous stimuli and found that the expectations did not influence access of nonambiguous images to awareness. Thus, our results converge on the conclusion that expectations or preparation may not affect either access to or the quality of aware perception of unambiguous stimuli. Whereas preparation may improve categorization or recognition of the stimuli by pre-activating category templates against which sensory information can be matched, it does not influence how the objects look like for the observer, that is, activating a template does not change the subjective, phenomenal experience of seeing. An exception may be a situation in which the same stimulus is presented repeatedly trial after trial so that the participant can consciously maintain the representation of that specific stimulus in working memory and match it with sensory information (Melloni, Schwiedrzik, Müller, Rodriguez, and Singer (2011) .
Unlike top-down preparation, masking by object substitution (OSM) influenced visual awareness in each condition. This result is in line with earlier findings indicating that OSM reduces awareness (Di Lollo et al., 2000; Dux, Visser, Goodhew, & Lipp, 2010; Koivisto, 2012; Koivisto et al., 2014) and therefore it was not surprising. The interesting point is that the influence of OSM on awareness was not modulated by attentional top-down preparation, suggesting that OSM and preparatory attention rely on separate processes. At present, the exact relationship between OSM and attention is not clear. Until recently, it was believed that OSM depends strongly on spatial attention (Di Lollo et al., 2000) , but recent studies have challenged this belief by showing that the major findings supporting it, the dependence of OSM on the set size and on exogenous spatial pre-cueing, do not replicate when ceiling effects and crowding are not allowed to influence (Argyropoulos et al., 2013; Camp et al., 2015; Filmer et al., 2014; Pilling et al., 2014) . There exists only little evidence for the role of other types of attention in OSM. Dux et al. (2010) used a dualtask paradigm and found that a task tapping high-level brain regions strengthened the masking effect in dual-task condition. However, the easier (single-task) condition seems to also suffer from a ceiling effect, which probably underestimated the masking effects in the single-task condition. In our Experiment 1, top-down preparation did not modulate the strength of OSM. However, in Experiment 2, preparation decreased the amount of masking by object substitution, but in the more powerful analysis on the data from both experiments this effect turned out to be due to high performance in one of the conditions (non-masked superordinate categorization in non-blocked condition). The independence of OSM on top-down preparation and other manipulations of attention suggest that OSM interferes at low levels of hierarchy with relatively passive processes that do not depend on voluntary attention.
To conclude, the present results help to explain why visual categorization of objects presented in natural scenes is easy and sometimes seems to occur in the near absence of attention (Fabre- Thorpe, 2011; Li et al., 2002; Thorpe et al., 1996) . Previous experiments which have demonstrated fast categorization have typically used a blocked design in which the category is predefined in the beginning of the experiment. Under blocked conditions (Experiment 1), attention can be preset for detecting the members of the category and thus top-down processing can be performed before the stimulus is displayed. The same effect of preparation could be observed also in non-blocked design with pre-cueing the category before the onset of the stimulus (Experiment 2). This kind of top-down processing or 'feedback' affects processes at the top of visual hierarchy and should not be confused with processes that occur at lower levels of hierarchy and are more directly related to visual awareness. Consistent with a recent review on the neural basis of visual awareness (Koch, Massimini, Boly, & Tononi, 2016) , it seems that the processes occurring in posterior parietal, temporal and occipital 'hot zone' are essential in subjective experience of seeing, that is, in visual awareness.
Finally, it must be noted that subjective scales of awareness, such as PAS and the variant of it we used, may be too unspecific in regard with the criterion contents used in evaluating subjective percepts (Bachmann, 2015; Sackur, 2013) . It remains possible that the attributes used by participants in evaluating the clarity of subjective perception do not tap some other subjective contents that differ while the 'clarity' level remains invariant. For example, it is possible that subjective contrast and subjective spatial frequency content have remained invariant between different conditions of category preparation, but local emphasis on one or another type of subjective content may still have differed between the preparation conditions. Therefore, the independence of awareness from top-down preparation should be verified in further studies by using methods that are sensitive to various criterion contents. In addition, to rule out potential confounding factors between image categories, it will be important to try to better control for the lowlevel visual features (luminance, contrast, spatial frequency, color, etc.) as well as some higher order visual statistics represented at early processing stages.
